Can Your Boss Trade You? The Employment Law Behind the AFL Trade Period

Finals may be in vogue in September, but trade speculation is never too far behind. Already, the familiar language of who is “gettable”, “on the table” or worth a particular draft pick is returning to dinner-table conversations and trade radio. Rowan Marshall is again a prime example. After St Kilda refused his requested move to Geelong during last year’s Trade Period, the contracted ruckman has again reportedly made clear his desire to leave the Saints.[1] His situation follows one of the biggest stories from 2025, when Zach Merrett sought a move from Essendon to Hawthorn despite having two years remaining on his contract. Essendon refused the request and Merrett remained a Bomber for 2026.[2]

These situations highlight how unusual employment in professional sport can be. AFL players are routinely discussed as “trade capital”, capable of being exchanged for another player or draft selections. As Amelia Devlyn observes, AFL labour controls restrict players’ ability to freely choose their employer and can significantly affect their bargaining power.[3] Yet professional footballers are employees, a position recognised by Australian courts long before the modern collective bargaining framework developed.[4]

The right to choose your employer

The common law doctrine of restraint of trade is central to this tension. In Adamson v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd, Wilcox J referred to the common law principle that people should be able to freely select where and for whom they wish to work.[5] A restraint on that freedom is not automatically unlawful, but under the principles originating in Nordenfelt, it must be reasonably necessary to protect a legitimate interest, reasonable as between the parties and not contrary to the public interest.[6]

Professional sport creates a particular difficulty because leagues rely on labour controls to promote competitive balance. Drafts direct emerging talent towards weaker clubs (not naming names), while salary caps limit the ability of wealthier clubs to accumulate the strongest players. Devlyn argues that these objectives may constitute legitimate interests capable of supporting some restrictions, while their effect on the players must still be considered when determining whether a restraint is reasonable.[7]

That balance was considered directly in Adamson, where the NSWRL’s internal draft restricted existing players from choosing their next club, including after their contracts had expired. The Full Federal Court ultimately held the system to be an unreasonable restraint of trade, with particular concern about its effect on players’ bargaining positions and freedom to choose an employer.[8] Importantly, Adamson did not establish that every sporting draft is necessarily unlawful. Chris Davies has subsequently argued that the AFL system can be distinguished because its players have greater bargaining power and more avenues to move between clubs than existed under the NSWRL model in question.[9]

From restriction to greater player control

The regulation of player movement has changed considerably. Devlyn notes that although the AFL draft initially restricts a player’s choice of employer, the modern system provides players with greater bargaining power over time through mechanisms including trades and free agency.[10] These protections distinguish the AFL system from the far more restrictive internal draft considered in Adamson, where players had significantly less control over where they could work once their contracts had expired.

The current AFL/AFLW Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) also directly acknowledges the tension between player freedom and the League’s labour controls. Clause 5(b) records the parties’ view that restrictions on players’ freedom to transfer between clubs, along with limits on total player payments, are “necessary and reasonable” to protect the legitimate interests of the AFL, its clubs and competitions.[11] In other words, the CBA does not pretend that these rules are not restraints. Instead, it expressly seeks to justify them as part of the structure required to operate the competition.

Player trading has undergone a similar evolution. Writing in 2006, Davies identified instances where AFL players became involved in proposed trades before being properly consulted. One striking example involved Trent Croad, who went into a post-season operation as a Hawthorn player while a deal sending him to Fremantle was being negotiated.[12] Davies argued that an express consent requirement would make the system much fairer.[13]

That protection now exists in clear terms with Schedule 5A of the current CBA providing that a club cannot exchange a player unless the player receives as much notice as possible, is subjected to no duress and “genuinely consents to the trade.”[14] That wording is important because it shows that, despite the language of players being “put on the table”, the club does not have an unfettered right to move an employee elsewhere.

Player consent does not, however, mean contracted players have complete freedom to leave. A club cannot force a player to move elsewhere, but a player also cannot necessarily compel their club to release them from an existing contract. Merrett wanted Hawthorn, but Essendon was entitled to reject his trade request while he remained contracted.[15] Marshall may face the same practical issue if St Kilda again refuses to reach an acceptable deal.[16]

More than trade capital

Overall, the Trade Period may be full of picks, swaps and “trade value”, but the players at the centre of it still have rights over where they work. Clubs have contracts to protect, players have careers to manage, and somewhere in the middle sits employment law. So, can your boss trade you? In the AFL, the club can certainly try, but they still need you to say yes before you end up interstate for a future second-round pick.

References

[1] Australian Football League, ‘Saints Ruck Requests Trade for Second Successive Year’, AFL.com.au (Web Page, 8 September 2026) https://www.afl.com.au/news/1606756/st-kilda-saints-ruck-rowan-marshall-requests-trade-for-second-successive-year.

[2] Callum Twomey, ‘The Pact Scott, Merrett Made after Bombers Star’s Failed Trade’, AFL.com.au (Web Page, 16 February 2026) https://www.afl.com.au/news/1466183/the-pact-brad-scott-zach-merrett-made-after-essendon-bombers-stars-failed-trade.

[3] Amelia Devlyn, ‘Labour Market Controls in the Australian Football League (AFL) and the Common Law Restraint of Trade Doctrine’ (2019) 3 Western Australian Student Law Review 13.

[4]Buckley v Tutty (1971) 125 CLR 353, 372.

[5]Adamson v New South Wales Rugby League Ltd (1991) 103 ALR 319, 355 (Wilcox J).

[6]Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co Ltd [1894] AC 535, 565.

[7] Devlyn, above n 3.

[8]Adamson, above n 5, 355–6.

[9] Chris Davies, ‘Draft Systems in Professional Team Sports and the Restraint of Trade Doctrine: Is the AFL Draft Distinguishable from the NSWRL Draft?’ (2006) 1(1) Australian and New Zealand Sports Law Journal 80, 90–1.

[10] Devlyn, above n 3.

[11] Australian Football League and AFL Players’ Association, AFL and AFLW Collective Bargaining Agreement 2023–2027 (Collective Bargaining Agreement, 2023) cl 5(b) https://www.aflplayers.com.au/resources/afl-aflw-collective-bargaining-agreement-2023-2027.

[12] Davies, above n 9, 97.

[13] Davies, above n 9, 98.

[14] Australian Football League and AFL Players’ Association, above n 11, sch 5A item 5.

[15] Twomey, above n 2.

[16] Australian Football League, above n 1.

Image: huntr via Flickr.