Coming to a Head: Private Equity Looms Large over Australia’s Summer of Cricket
In arguably the most beloved judicial opinion of the last century, Lord Denning famously said:
“In summertime village cricket is the delight of everyone. Nearly every village has its own cricket field where the young men play and the old men watch…” [1]
While uttered in the context of 20th-century England, Denning’s poignant description of cricket as a unifying force during the summer months is equally applicable to modern Australia. The code wars splitting football fans down either side of the Barassi Line disappear as the days grow longer. Goalposts are replaced by turf wickets, and both young and old spend their Saturdays at cricket grounds around the country.
However, the fabric of the Australian cricketing summer is under threat, at risk of becoming the latest nation targeted by the growing influence of private equity. It was reported that Pat Cummins and Travis Head, two of Australia’s leading all-format players, recently rejected $10 million offers to quit the national side and instead play franchise T20 cricket year-round.
Currently, Australia’s cricketers are contracted by Cricket Australia (“CA”) directly, either via central contracts or via contracts with their States. The Big Bash League (“BBL”) clubs contract players separately, but remain owned by Cricket Australia and managed by the six State Associations. This differentiates the BBL from most cricket leagues around the world, where private equity has seen individual owners take stakes in franchises across multiple leagues.
The Indian Premier League (“IPL”), far and away the largest league, has seen the owners of its franchises expand into other competitions worldwide. The South African equivalent of the BBL, the SA20, features six teams, which are all owned by the owners of IPL teams. This has allowed the SA20 to offer players larger sums than can be secured in the BBL, for a shorter competition. Given the BBL and SA20 operate at roughly the same time, players cannot realistically play a substantive part in both. The SA20’s competitive advantages are hindering the BBL’s ability to secure the best talent available.
One solution posed to deal with this problem is private equity. Broadly, the ownership of clubs would be transferred from CA to private entities, who ostensibly have far more resources to be able to sustain larger salary caps. While this would allow the BBL to nullify some advantages possessed by the other T20 leagues, it is worth noting that private ownership has its pitfalls. The level of control or influence over players that might be sought by new owners is presently unclear. Given the desire to make franchise contracts permanent year-long ventures, it is likely that players would need to seek permission from their respective franchise to play for the national side. However, as was the case with the proposed Cummins and Head deals, they might also be prohibited from playing national cricket altogether.
The ability for players to realise their financial potential and provide for themselves and their families via franchise T20 cricket is undisputed. Given the amount of money on offer for representing one’s national team often pales in comparison with that available in franchise cricket, this is a completely understandable goal. As the shadow of private equity continues to loom over Australian cricket, CA must continue to emphasise the honour of playing for one’s country. However, it should also recognise that players are professionals for a finite amount of time only and are entitled to maximise their income during this period. Striking a balance between both views gives Australian cricket the best chance of remaining a force into the future.
References:
[1] Miller v Jackson [1977] QB 966
[5] Cover Photo by John Oswald on Unsplash